Jupiter thrives on community participation. While major decisions and protocol direction are rightly guided by the formal JUP DAO voting process (using staked JUP), there are often smaller operational or community initiatives requiring modest funding (e.g., up to $10,000 USD). Currently, the process for approving these smaller budgets may not fully leverage the collective wisdom and engagement of our active community members.
This proposal seeks to enhance decentralization, transparency, and fairness for these specific types of decisions by introducing a new, supplementary voting mechanism. We value the contributions of the existing “Cats of Culture” (CoC) members and propose that their existing system and privileges remain intact. This new role aims to expand participation, not replace existing structures.
Problem Statement(s)
Limited Participation: Decision-making on smaller funding proposals (defined here as <= $10,000 USD) might be concentrated within a limited group, potentially excluding valuable perspectives from highly active and knowledgeable community members.
Transparency: The process for approving these smaller budgets could be more transparent and accessible to the broader community.
Engagement Opportunity: Many dedicated users actively contribute insightful discussions, feedback, and research within the Jupiter Discord and on Jupresearch. Providing them with a direct way to influence smaller budgetary decisions acknowledges their contributions and fosters deeper engagement.
Proposed Solution: “daoKitty” Discord Role
We propose the creation of a new Discord role named “daoKitty” or perhaps something more appropriate, lol.
Purpose: Holders of the “daoKitty” role would gain the right to vote on specifically designated, small-scale budget proposals (up to a maximum of $10,000 USD per proposal) that fall outside the scope of formal, on-chain JUP DAO votes.
Non-Exclusive: This role complements, rather than replaces, existing roles and processes. Cats of Culture members would retain any existing voting rights they may have on these matters. Formal DAO voting for larger issues remains unchanged.
Focus: This role is specifically for providing community input on discretionary spending for smaller initiatives, bounties, “pre-work group” micro-grants, or community projects, not core protocol changes or major strategic decisions.
Eligibility Criteria
The goal is to identify demonstrably active and constructive community members. Eligibility should be based on positive contributions, not just presence. Potential criteria could include a combination of:
Discord Activity: Consistent, helpful, and constructive participation in relevant channels within the official Jupiter Discord. Quality over quantity should be emphasized.
Jupresearch Contributions: Meaningful participation in discussions on the Jupresearch forum (jupresear.ch), such as well-reasoned posts, insightful feedback, or initiating valuable discussions. Take into account any rare badges or roles that the user might have attained.
Community Standing: General recognition as a net-positive and contributing member of the Jupiter ecosystem.
Implementation Plan
Role Assignment:
An application process seems most appropriate. Interested individuals could submit a brief application outlining their contributions and activity.
Applications could be reviewed periodically (e.g., monthly or quarterly) by a designated committee (e.g., Jupiter Core Team members, CWG, and CaWG) to ensure fairness and quality.
Voting Mechanism:
Establish a dedicated Discord channel (e.g., #community-budget-votes) or use the existing “#thunderdome” where proposals are posted.
Utilize the current Thunderdome system that is in place for simple polling using the existing infrastructure. Grant voting privilege to people with the “daoKitty” role. People will be able to vote Yes, No, or Abstain.
Votes would be invisible to ensure privacy; however, everyone who voted will be listed under said vote (similar to the current system)
Proposal Format: Small budget proposals submitted for this type of vote should follow a simple, standardized template outlining the goal, requested amount, justification, and expected outcome.
Quorum & Passing Threshold: Define clear rules (e.g., minimum number of votes required for validity, percentage required for approval) – to be discussed and agreed upon. Use the current quorum system if it’s deemed adequate. “CoC votes” and “daoKitty votes” may simply be added together to obtain a final tally.
Relationship with Cats of Culture (CoC)
This proposal explicitly respects the legacy Cats of Culture system.
CoCs are welcome and encouraged to apply for the “daoKitty” role if they meet the criteria, but it’s not automatic unless they already possess the criteria that is outlined in this proposal.
Any existing privileges or voting rights held by CoCs concerning small budgets remain unaffected; however, in the event that an individual has/obtains both roles, only a single vote will count toward the final tally. This new role simply broadens the pool of eligible voters.
Benefits
Democratization & Fairness: Distributes decision-making power for smaller initiatives more broadly.
Neutrality: Reduces the potential for decisions to be influenced by a very small group.
Community Buy-in: Increases engagement and ownership by involving active members directly.
Leverages Expertise: Taps into the collective intelligence of dedicated community members on Discord and Jupresearch.
Thanks ser! You’re free to tack on any ideas you might have. We’ve worked together to brainstorm a lot of ideas for the DAO over the past couple of months, and you’ve proven yourself to be a very valuable member of the community.
Klbkch, I want to sincerely thank you for this thoughtful and pragmatic proposal. It’s precisely the kind of initiative that gives structure to the often fuzzy concept of “community participation.” You’ve taken a clear problem — lack of accessible micro-funding pathways — and offered a smart, actionable framework that enhances decentralization without creating friction with existing structures like CoC or CWGs. That’s not easy, and I respect the balance you’ve struck.
What resonates most with me is that this proposal isn’t trying to boil the ocean or fix everything at once. Instead, it zeroes in on a defined blind spot: low-barrier funding decisions that are too small for full DAO referenda, yet too important to be opaque or overly centralized. You’ve created a way to channel energy from contributors who have consistently shown up in Discord and on Jupresearch — the kind of people who don’t hold titles, but hold this ecosystem up.
That said, I see this as part of something much bigger — and I hope it can serve as the first functional building block of a broader framework. If we’re serious about DAO maturity, we’ll need more than “kitty votes” on micro-budgets. We’ll eventually need a Council or Assembly to set priorities, oversee execution, and be accountable to all stakers. But the strength of your proposal is that it starts small, gets real, and builds legitimacy. That’s how every strong governance system begins.
A couple of small suggestions for future refinement:
Proposal Transparency: Adding a lightweight “post-mortem” requirement could help track which small proposals delivered on their goals, so learnings compound.
Role Renewal: Consider limited terms for “daoKitty” holders, with periodic re-evaluation — not as punishment, but to keep the group dynamic and open to new contributors.
Integration Pathway: It’d be interesting to explore how this voting layer could one day evolve into a more formal proposal review layer, feeding into a broader governance process.
In short: this is a good step forward — and a rare one that is both doable and meaningful. Let’s test it, iterate on it, and use it as a launchpad for the larger structures the DAO desperately needs.
Kudos again for crafting something this concrete and clear.
And one final note: I’d like to kindly ask the team and the existing Core Working Group to seriously consider taking this concept, shaping it into a proposal, and putting it up for a formal DAO vote. Right now, our DAO lacks the internal scaffolding to govern itself effectively. Without a structure like this, the team is constantly being pulled away from building and shipping just to babysit a system that was supposed to be decentralized. CWGs are already managing their own share of responsibilities — we shouldn’t expect them to absorb everything else too. It’s time we move away from this centralized babysitting model and take meaningful steps toward autonomy. This could be the beginning.
Love the suggestions
I think it’s important to take baby steps and not immediately start demanding for utility, especially when the team is adamantly against it at the current moment. We can still do our part in democratizing the DAO from the ground up! Hopefully, this will lead to meaningful changes on other fronts as well.
This is a great proposal, I like it
Even in full support to give access to more active community members in decision making regarding DAO funding for community projects and proposals.
Would be helpful to have a full understanding of current processes in the DAO because I am unsure how the current system functions fully. I like that this clearly outlines a problem and solution. Happy to help as needed. I would also suggest that CoCs shouldnt retain any privledges but apply as everyone else does and also introduce a system to make sure people who hold the role are actively utilizing it.
I understand that you’re busy, but I’m wondering if you have a response for this. Will wait patiently if you do.
At the current moment, a lot of us just feel like many proposals, even ones that are pragmatic in nature, just end up dead on arrival. I’ve spent hours/days of my time brainstorming DAO stuff, and sometimes it’s just a bit discouraging to feel as if my voice isn’t being heard.
tbh i think this is pretty well covered by the existing grant system - in my experience with grants, the main 2 things that matter are 1) speed of application and 2) speed to receiving funding. that ensures that talented people who are excited about contributing can do so with minimal friction and get to work.
the current microgrants systems we have are fairly well designed for this purpose - they don’t require voting/consensus, and are able to make decisions quickly and autonomously
i understand the benefit of more folks having perspectives that can be added in, but i think the tradeoff is not worth it in terms of slower decisions, more opportunities for favoritism, etc.
are there specific grant ideas that you think right now are being rejected that would otherwise be approved (and would add clear value!) if we implemented the kitty system?
I appreciate the polite and well-thought out response! To answer your question- yes, I do have examples of ideas that got rejected that otherwise might have been accepted had the greater community and DAO contributors, other than just CoCs had a say. May I message you in private?
Btw, this proposal was actually inspired by something that Julian posted in Discord. This is what he said:
“on hindsight maybe we should have removed all the roles that were grandfathered in before adopting new standards etc.
but yeah
i think there were pros and cons
of both approaches
now we are seeing the cons of it
but the pros is that it kept the continuity”
My proposal will ensure both continuity and allow more active individuals to participate in the voting process.
Also, as Slorg and others have said, the microgrants system is meant to encourage experimentation with ideas that can drive value to the ecosystem. Even you have tweeted that we shouldn’t have a scarcity mindset when the DAO has a 10mil usdc war chest that gets topped up. I understand that it’s important to be fiscally responsible, but there should also be a reasonable barrier to entry for people who want to get involved.
