appreciate your opinion, and yes agreed we should have a discord role for supervoters!
i would strongly disagree that direct democracy isnât in use because of technology/power dynamics.
itâs because countries have too much to legistlate on, and thereâs no world in which a regular vote can stay informed on all of it. state legistlatures in the US for example can do up to 120,000 bills in a year. itâs just not feasible to have direct democracy at the same time.
but anyway, on the merits - i hear you re: delegation reducing your feeling that goverance is meaningful.
in theory, i agree that stakers who donât want to invest time/energy into governance shouldnât hold the token. but in practice, that is obviously not going to be the case as long as ASR exists.
re: whale splitting, i think itâs likely going to be solved by increasing the number of Representatives, which also makes it easier for more folks to remain actively involved personally, from their own wallet.
but all in all, appreciate your perspective!
your DMs donât look like my DMs then lolll
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agreed - i think the ASR benefit will keep them engaged on the margins though, checking from time to time, enough to keep vote quality above the bottom.
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yeah, some of the other comments on here also making me think we could make it even bigger, though the coordination cost increases accordingly
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say more?
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definitely agree, hence the creation of the budget threshold. can reduce it if need be to make more things full-DAO worthy!
Thank you for the thoughtful replies!
I agree that there are some natural barriers, as you described, but I also know that people with resources can get over most of them, and, especially for the extra power it would bring, it would probably be worth it to them. Increasing the number of Representatives is also a possible additional mitigant, but 1) we get further into the unruly territory, and 2) we also reduce the threshold needed to be in the top X (letâs let X=1,001). For example, right now, 100,001 JUP staked would put you in the top ~800. See image below from our friends at catalytics.pro
Using the 20mm JUP example, they could create ~200 wallets with ~100k JUP each, and would have somewhere around 20% of Representatives in a 1,001 Representative scenario (795+200=995-1 (old 20mm wallet) = all in the top 994).
Finally, for 3, 1) hopefully the DAO treasury is never depleted, but 2) we can have a vote to deplete it of whatever is left. It would just need to go to a full vote (as it should).
Just sharing my additional thoughts. It will be a tough choice for the DAO.
Much love, my dear friend!
I strongly disagree with this. The only reason countries and states legislate so much is because those representatives are trying to justify their existence by over-inflating their importance. This brings to mind two quotes from Thomas Sowell:
âYou will never understand bureaucracies until you understand that for bureaucrats procedure is everything and outcomes are nothing.â
âNo one will really understand politics until they understand that politicians are not trying solve our problems. They are trying to solve their own problems - of which getting elected and re-elected are number one and number two. Whatever is number three is far behind.â
Many countries would be much better off if 99% of their legislation were eliminated. Excessive regulation is the enemy of progress.
If you agree with it in theory then why reward them for their apathy? Not investing the time/energy is their decision to make. To me, the most important part of ASR is Active. If theyâre not being actively involved, should they even be getting ASR? I say, that they shouldnât.
All that not withstanding, thatâs why Option 2 is the best option. Itâs the best of both worlds - opt-in delegation for the apathetic lazy ones and direct voting for the truly aligned.
I donât doubt you receive a lot of DMs about having too many votes along with a stack of other complaints, but that doesnât mean the entire way we do governance needs to change to satisfy those complaints.
If voting gets too demanding, voters can simply skip a vote and it doesnât cause a single issue whatsoever. They will still be rewarded proportionate to their level of participation.
There are other ways to address this problem. One way would be to get all proposals out in the open much sooner than a couple of days prior to the vote going live. Post proposals 30 days out with progressively scheduled votes or concurrent votes. People are capable of discussing more than one subject at a time.
For example, CWG and UWG Budget votes are upcoming. Get the proposals posted now and put voting dates on the schedule. This is trivial. An additional benefit is that people will be able to plan accordingly versus being reactive to votes going live and ending so soon after announcement.
Of the seven backlogged votes, I count the JJWG, CWG and UWG Budgets as three and this Representative discussion as one. That makes four. What are the other three? Or are they super-duper need-to-know top secret?
Yeah Iâll be putting up a political campaign to get votes for sure
Really appreciate your feedback, Kash
What I had in mind with a hybrid approach is a system where vote weight or decision power is capped or distributed across tiers â not every rep having full power over everything.
For example:
Proposals could be routed through different âclassesâ of reps depending on scope or impact (e.g. community initiatives vs budget-heavy proposals).
Another idea: reps could have capped vote weights unless theyâre re-delegated from multiple stakers over time â sort of like earning credibility dynamically.
We could also imagine âcheckpointâ votes where the full DAO can veto or confirm rep-approved proposals above a certain threshold.
The goal here is to keep the agility reps offer, but inject enough transparency to avoid unintended centralization or rep fatigue.
I wanted to give my thoughts on this, as this proposal is one I feel very strongly about, due to my proximity to planning votes, trying to make the calendars fit into place. This is one of the most important discussions the DAO has engaged in, and its result will have massive consequence, not only for potential representatives but for everything we are trying to accomplish as a DAO.
Many of you probably know that the CWG is actively involved in planning, initiating and executing votes for the DAO. The unspoken aspect of this is the planning that goes into a vote. And trust me, there is a lot of it. We make plans and coordinate events during each vote for the specific purpose of educating the DAO voter base on a proposals contents and its existence. The goal being that everyone has a reasonable opportunity to be made aware that there is an upcoming/ongoing vote and to educate the voters about the purpose and contents of the proposal in question.
This is an immensely difficult process that requires coordination between multiple parties, multiple avenues of communication, broadcast ability, and most importantly; TIME.
TIME is something we simply do not have enough of. We often say that the DAO can be compared to an onion. It has multiple layers. The inner-most layer is the core community. They are here every day, and as such typically always know first when thereâs a vote ongoing. The challenge is reaching out to the middle layers, the outer layers etc. The DAO is comprised of several different factions, and we must do our best to reach them all in our communications about ongoing votes. And as such, TIME is needed to ensure that the vote messaging reaches all layers of the onion. We also want to avoid voter-fatigue, which again adds an element of time in between votes.
Right now, as I am writing this, I do so knowing that our scheduling is already challenging. We have many improvements to governance, important initiatives that are about to lapse their funding(like for instance the grants system) and a myriad of cool things that could go to a vote, and not enough time to plan everything accordingly.
Now, how do we solve this? We do so through representatives. We do so through the Option 1. Because if we are going to use representatives we need to do so through mandatory delegation in order to leverage greater agility for voters, and this is something most larger DAOâs that have been around for a while has already figured out.
I feel very strongly that Option 1 is the right way to go, because it is the sole option that improves our agility as a DAO and enables us to make more decisions as a DAO, clear our backlog, pursue votes we otherwise couldnât because there isnât time etc.
Iâm glad to see this being officially brought up after much discussion around the topic previously.
I prefer option 2 much more than option 1. Option 1 will naturally leave itself open to people complaining that Whales are controlling the outcomes of the votes when decisions donât go the way people wanted with the proposed model, it already happens with some votes and this system will only make it worse seeing as it will only be the top 301 stakers who have a say.
Option 2 is the most decentralised way of doing this optimally, it gives everyone their own choice on how they would like to be represented and how active they would like to be while still solving the DAOs issue of needing to push votes out more frequently to clear the backlog. I also disagree with the final point in option 2, maybe at the start this will be a problem but once the system has been in place long enough, I see no reason it canât be used to hold votes as frequently as option 1 would have.
If time is more of what you need then what is the purpose of opening discussion for a vote only days prior to it going live? Why not start the discussion 30 or 60 days out from the vote. That gives plenty of TIME to create awareness.
For example, schedule the upcoming (Iâm assuming) Uplink Budget Proposal vote to start on July 11th. That gives you almost 6 weeks to hammer that date into peoplesâ minds. Post it on the JupSync Calendar. Announce it during every Planetary Call from now until then. Post reminders on X. Everyone gets to see it nice and early and can prepare accordingly.
The way things are done now, anyone who goes on vacation for a week to ten days has the potential to miss the announcement, subsequent discussion, and entire voting window. Makes no sense.
As someone who scheduled multi-millions of dollars worth of construction projects with far more moving pieces than a DAO vote, I call BS. There is plenty of time. It just needs to be utilized better.
Bottom line: If you want more time, then give yourself more time by getting out ahead of things. It really is that simple.
I appreciate the thoughts. We could open discussion earlier for the votes where proposals are finalized well ahead of time, sure. Thatâs not a bad idea, and I will try to keep that in mind. As it relates to JupSync and vote we cannot finalize vote dates that far ahead as some votes are more time sensitive and reliant on external factors than others, and the schedule often shifts to prioritize the most pressing proposals. That is one thing that is out of my control.
There is truth in this, sure. We can easily run votes concurrently throughout and thus increase our decision-making speed massively. We have tried running votes closer together to one another, but complaints in regards to voter-fatigue and general confusion surrounding votes quickly became a concern. When I say we donât have time, what I mean is that weâve made a conscious decision to be a DAO where everyone can participate meaningfully, which means we have to cater to a lot of different user-groups, whether theyâre comfortable consuming and voting on proposals rapidly or prefer a slower pace better suited to their schedule. Representatives is an attempt to increase our decision-making speed without adversely affecting any particular voter group.
Hi Kash
Another thought which has come to me, what if users delegate to an individual and for some unknown reason they miss the vote? I suspect this would be less that 1% chance of happening, but what happens if it does happen? Will those who delegated miss the ASR for that vote?
The Representative System offers a balanced solution by streamlining governance for routine matters while preserving full DAO involvement for significant decisions. It encourages leadership and accountability among Representatives and provides flexibility for stakers to participate directly when desired. However, itâs crucial to implement safeguards to ensure transparency and prevent centralization of power. Regular reviews of Representative performance and clear mechanisms for stakers to express dissent are essential.
I disagree with this. This is exactly what proper scheduling solves. Schedule the time sensitive ones first. Further, anything scheduled need not be set in stone. The schedule can be adjusted and specific proposals moved forward or back in time as needed. Thatâs where opening them up for discussion early proves beneficial. It provides flexibility.
Imagine if there was a standing spot on the calendar for votes such as the first Monday of every month. Or even the 1st and 15th of every month. That would be 24 slots for the year. You could fill those slots with whichever proposal is most pressing and everyone would know when the next vote is happening.
These two statements somewhat contradict each other, IMO. By moving to a mandatory representative system (Option 1) you WILL be adversely affecting a particular voting group - i.e., the group of people just like me who donât want to delegate and want to vote on their own behalf - thus affecting our ability to participate meaningfully. Thatâs why Option 2 is better. It is the only option that caters to every group to some degree.
Which option caters to the most people?
Anyway, Iâve made my case and offered what I think are reasonable solutions to the point of almost becoming a pest. Iâm ready to see what happens. I do hope the proposal is structured with three options:
Option 1: Representative System
Option 2: Opt-In Delegation
Option 3: No change. The system stays as-is
Ultimately, the community will decide what it wants and those that disagree with the result will either have to live with it or move on.
This is probably thinking way too much into it but how do you stop corruption, for example; lets say I give my voting power to someone who is saying they are going to vote against it and a the last second they take the option for it because they are getting a kick back in some way. how do you stop that from happening?
Iâm open to creating open vote slots to fill as the schedule requires. Some votes do however come out of left field on shorter notice, which is harder to plot in advance, but some improvement could possibly be made. We do have something very similar to this internally.
I guess thatâs true, although if you want your opinion to be reflected in each vote you can simply select a delegate that votes in the direction you want your vote to reflect. Option 2 does not provide an option in which we can run votes faster and with less broadcast saturation, which is really the time-consuming part of running a vote in the DAO right now. Alternatively you could attempt to become a representative yourself.
I think this is the likely structure of the options, but I donât know just yet.
Except then I would have to defend two fronts. First, I would have to get up to speed on the proposal at hand AND I would have to vet a delegate that could potentially still screw me over and vote opposite my wishes.
Just to play devilâs advocate, what happens when all 301 delegates come out in support of a proposal and declare their intention to vote âFORâ, yet, you want to vote âAGAINSTâ? There could theoretically NOT be a delegate that will cast a vote the way you want.
Ultimately, I donât trust delegates to do what they say and I donât believe I should have to.
Further, I have no desire to be a delegate and have to stump for othersâ voting rights.
I believe it is possible to run votes faster with the current system. Things just need to be done better.