Hey Milkman, appreciate you chiming in and taking the time to engage. 
I get why the 2030 proposal seemed reasonable on the surface—Meow locking tokens until 2030 sounds like long-term alignment. But when you look closer, the actual structure of the vote—and the precedent it sets—raises serious concerns.
The vote presented two options:
- Yes: Meow fronts 280M JUP for new hires, locks his tokens until 2030, and receives a 220M JUP bonus from the community reserve.
- No: The 280M JUP comes from the team’s strategic reserve, and Meow’s tokens unlock in 2026 as originally planned.
So the community was effectively given a false choice:
“Approve this bonus, or the founder unlocks and could sell early.”
That’s not decentralization—that’s coercive framing.
Even more troubling: Meow said the DAO could veto his 220M bonus “at any time.”
But under our current DAO Resolution, that’s not true. There’s no mechanism to claw it back. Once the vote passed, it became irreversible.
So now we’re in a situation where:
- A founder secures 500M JUP (7% of supply),
- Paid largely from the community’s side,
- With no clear KPIs, no deliverables, and no ability to revoke the bonus if things go off-track.
This broke the 50/50 principle that was supposed to ensure balance between team and community. It set a precedent where community funds can be tapped to solve team problems—without accountability.
That’s why many of us opposed the vote—not because we don’t believe in Meow’s work, but because this structure weakened governance, diluted holders, and concentrated power.
If this is the new norm, what happens next time?
We need to restore clarity:
- Reaffirm the 50/50 split.
- Set real checks on community treasury usage.
- And avoid vote structures designed around fear of the alternative.
Happy to continue the conversation. This stuff matters. 
Have a read on this : The Silent Loop: Buybacks, Unlocks, litter.box and the Search for Purpose in $JUP